中圖分類號： TP309
文獻標識碼： A
DOI： 10.20044/j.csdg.2097-1788.2022.01.010
引用格式： 楊歡樂，劉志天. Tor隱藏服務DoS攻擊方法研究[J].網絡安全與數據治理，2022，41(1)：63-69.

DoS attack method on Tor hidden service

Abstract： Tor hidden service can protect the privacy of service provider′s identity address and location. On the basis of analyzing the Tor hidden service protocol, this paper proposes a DoS attack strategy for hidden services. DoS attacks based on bandwidth and memory are carried out on network nodes related to hidden services such as hidden service catalogs, introduction nodes, hidden service guard nodes, and hidden servers at different stages of Tor hidden service release, link establishment, and data transmission to reduce hidden services. The attack is verified by simulation experiments. The experimental results show that the DoS attack on the guard node has a good attack effect. Using the bandwidth-level DoS attack, the custom construction of 20 long paths can consume about 1.2 MB/s of bandwidth resources of the guard nodes, which increases the median delay time for ordinary users to obtain hidden services from 9 s to 30 s. Using the memory-level DoS attack strategy, the adversary consumes about 60 KB/s of bandwidth resources for each memory-level stop-read attack connection to consume the guard node memory at a rate of 6 MB/s.

Key words : Tor；DoS attack；guard node；hidden service